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PROSECUTING PAST CIVIL RIGHTS CRIMES IN MARYLAND 
By: John Maclean 
TIme's glory is to calm contending kings, 
To unmask falsehoods and bring truth to light .... 
- William Shakespeare I 
I. Introduction 
On October 18, 1933, in Princess Anne, Maryland, 
a mob of at least 500 white Eastern Shore residents gath-
ered around the county jailhouse. 2 They cried out for 'jus-
tice." They wanted to see George Annwood, anAfrican 
American male charged of attacking an eighty-one-year 
old elderly white woman, punished.3 A fight ensued at the 
jailhouse door; thirteen State Troopers were injured.4 
Overcome, officers failed to stop the stampede.s 
The mob dragged Armwood from his cell to the 
street. 6 They raised up his body and lynched him.7 The 
next day, Governor Albert Cabell Ritchie ordered the At-
torney General of the State of Maryland to take charge 
and lead the investigation. S With the aid of detectives from 
Baltimore, several suspects were later arrested.9 One of 
the suspects was a police officer. \0 However, no one was 
ever charged or convicted in the death. I I Case closed. 12 
Imagine - you are a prosecutor in Maryland with 
enough evidence on the perpetrators of this crime to bring 
the case to trial. Would you reopen the case seventy years 
later and prosecute, knowing that you will face evidentiary 
problems and possible public backlash? 
Over the last twenty years, state prosecutors are in-
creasingly addressing similar questions and, in some cases, 
deciding to prosecute. \3 Maryland prosecutors could soon 
face such decisions. In addition to the Annwood murder, 
there are other unresolved civil rights crimes in Maryland's 
past, including: (1) at least six deaths and 600 injuries dur-
ing the 1968 Baltimore City riots; 14 (2) a non-fatal shoot-
ing ofapolice officer in 1967;15 and (3) a mob lynching in 
1931.16 
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Aside from evidentiary hurdles, should Maryland 
prosecutors try these cases, they will inevitably face is-
sues of politics. To be sure, prosecuting unresolved civil 
rights cases would create its own niche of prosecutorial 
rules and pitfalls in Maryland. 
II. Should We Prosecute Unsolved Civil 
Rights Crimes? 
Legal scholars, historians and civil rights attorneys 
differ on whether past unsolved civil rights crimes should 
be prosecuted. Dr. Sylvia Bradley, former American 
history professor at Salisbury University, argues that 
crimes in the distant past, like the 1930s, should not be 
prosecuted.1 7 According to Dr. Bradley, such prosecu-
tions would revive animosity or racial dissent, which was 
buried by progress during the civil rights movement and 
through time. ls Further, Dr. Bradley suggests that more 
recent civil rights crimes should be prosecuted as a mat-
ter of criminal justice and in light of the evidence specific 
to the case, not as hostile response to racial acts com-
mitted in the past. 19 
Other state civil rights leaders and historians dis-
agree. Neil Duke, a Maryland attorney and NAACP 
Baltimore Chapter First Assistant Vice-President, con-
tends that past civil rights crimes should be prosecuted 
without regard to negative feelings that may resurface.20 
In Mr. Duke's view, society needs to confront past 
crimes in order to move forward.21 Professor Sherrilyn 
Ifill, an expert on 1930s civil rights crimes, agrees with 
Mr. Duke.22 Professor I:fill asserts that since mass lynch-
ings are crimes committed by many members of a com-
munity, they are crimes committed essentially by soci-
etyP According to Professor Ifill, society must recon-
cile its past problems to improve and understand present 
circumstanceS.24 Lastly, Cambridge Police Department 
Chief Kenneth Malik opines that police officials should 
investigate and prosecute these past crimes because they 
are crimes, and, as such, all crimes should be followed 
through to closure.2s 
Bradley, Duke, Ifill, and Malik raise fundamental is-
sues relating to the vindication of past civil rights crimes. 
Indeed, prosecuting such crimes should be undertaken if 
there is enough evidence. Moreover, unresolved past civil 
rights crimes are no different than any other crime and 
should not be afforded special treatment to bypass the 
criminal justice system. In addition, prosecuting the per-
petrators of these crimes would serve as reinforcement to 
minority groups that their rights would be heard by soci-
ety and the criminal justice system. By prosecuting past 
civil rights crimes, the criminal justice system, which is cast 
in a shadow of distrust by many in the minority commu-
nity, could demonstrate that it strives to serve their inter-
ests, not merely the interests of the wealthy, the few, and 
the privileged. 
III. Types of Evidence 
As many law students may recall from their second 
year oflaw school, th~re are two types of evidence: direct 
and circumstantial. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 
direct evidence is "evidence that is based on personal 
knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact 
without inference or presumption. ''26 Circumstantial evi-
dence, on the other hand, "consists of proof of collateral 
facts and circumstances from which the existence of amain 
fact may be inferred according to reason and common 
experience."27 Prosecutions of unresolved civil rights 
crimes fall into three case scenarios: (1) the case against 
the defendant will only involve direct evidence; (2) the 
case will involve a combination of direct and circumstan-
tial evidence; and (3) the case will involve only circum-
stantial evidence showing the defendant's guilt. 
Cases in which prosecution occurs years after the 
crimes were committed tend to use circumstantial evi-
dence.28 Indeed, lack of direct evidence could be a rea-
son for not prosecuting these cases in the first place.29 
Naturally, state investigations conducted years after these 
crimes occurred would more likely discover circumstan-
tial evidence than direct evidence, which may have been 
lost or destroyed. As a result, it is likely that prosecutors 
would rely on circumstantial evidence, with a scant level 
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of direct evidence, to seek indictments and, thereafter, 
successfully prosecute past civil rights cases.30 To be sure, 
the United States Supreme Court held it is possible to 
secure a conviction with only circumstantial evidence of a 
defendant's guilt,31 but it is uncommon that a case against 
a defendant would only involve circumstantial evidence. 
One conviction, however, stands out for its near to-
tal dependency on circumstantial evidence. In 1963, the 
nation was stunned by the bombing of the Sixteenth 
Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama in which 
four young African American girls were killed and a num-
ber of other people injured as a result of a domestic ter-
rorist attack by Klu Klux Klansman Robert Edward 
Chambliss.32 The church was destroyed.33 The only 
stained glass window in the church that remained in its 
frame showed Christ leading a group oflittle children,34 
but the face of Christ was blown out. 3S Presidentlohn F. 
Kennedy, yachting off Newport, Rhode Island, was noti-
fied by radiotelephone almost immediately and Attomey 
General Robert F. Kennedy ordered Burke Marshall to 
Binningham.36 Within days, at least twenty-five FBI agents, 
including bomb experts from Washington, were sent to 
investigate the bomb scene.37 
Despite substantial federal and local resources, the 
State of Alabama indicted Chambliss in September of 
1977.38 As the appellate court noted, by that time, the 
case against Chambliss was largely circumstantial.39 The 
prosecutor's office relied on statements and conduct by 
Chambliss evidencing his anger and racism towardsAfri-
canAmericans (i.e., his membership in the Klu Klux Klan), 
his knowledge of bomb making, and a conversation with 
his niece a day before the bombing in which he stated that 
"he had enough stuff put away to flatten half of Binning-
ham" and "[y]oujust wait until after Sunday morning, and 
they will beg us to let them segregate ... just wait ... [y lou 
will see. "40 More damning, however, was a statement 
made in the presence of his niece on the Saturday evening 
following the bombing.41 According to Chambliss' niece, 
a television broadcast mentioned the likelihood of murder 
charges stemming from the bombing and that Chambliss 
responded, "It wasn't meant to hurt anybody. It didn't go 
offwhen it was supposed to."42 Additionally, Ms. Gertrude 
Glenn testified for the State and said that she saw 
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Chambliss' automobile parked on Seventh Avenue North 
behind and across an alley from the church at two 0' clock 
on the morning of the explosion.43 No one, though, saw 
Chambliss at the crime scene moments prior to or after 
the bombing. Nevertheless, Chambliss was convicted for 
the murders in 1977 and died in jail eight years later at the 
age of eighty-one.44 
Affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court 
emphasized, "As we have indicated this case is based on 
circumstantial evidence. Appellant did not testify. The 
evidence presented by the State [is uncontradicted]."45 
Moreover, the court noted, "Where the State relies upon 
circumstantial evidence for a conviction testimony may 
permissibly take a wide range and any fact from which an 
inference may be drawn is competent evidence. "46 
While Chambliss relied almost exclusively on cir-
cumstantial evidence, most cases, including past civil rights 
crimes, require and involve both circumstantial and direct 
evidence.47 For instance, Alabama prosecutors used cir-
cumstantial evidence of the defendant's conflicting state-
ments, which placed him at the crime scene at the ap-
proximate time of the homicide.48 The prosecution also 
presented direct evidence that the murder weapon was 
observed in the defendant's home prior to the crime. 
Iv. Conviction Standards & Appellate Review 
From almost day one in criminal law class (or by 
watching The Practice or Law & Order), law students 
learn that in a criminal trial the prosecution has the burden 
of persuasion as to every element of the case.49 The Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland has held that a judge must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the pros-
ecution when determining whether the prosecution has 
established aprimaJacie case.50 The general standard 
of proof for a criminal conviction is beliefbeyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 51 That standard applies to the three types 
of evidentiary scenarios mentioned supra. 
As the Chambliss case demonstrated, rarely, how-
ever, does the process oflitigating civil rights crimes end 
at the trial court stage; appellate courts often weigh in. 
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Appellate courts have upheld convictions if the direct and 
circumstantial evidence supported rational inferences from 
which the trier of fact could have been convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the essential elements of the crime. 52 
However, federal and state case law dictates that convic-
tions based solely on circumstantial evidence are also sub-
ject to other standards.53 The Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland has stated that inferences of circumstantial 
evidence must be inconsistent with any theory of inno-
cence.54 When considering the evidence, a conviction may 
be achieved even if there is a weak link in the chain of 
custody, meaning not every link of the chain needs to reach 
the reasonable doubt standard. 55 The culmination of evi-
dence, however, must reach the reasonable doubt stan-
dard.56 
If the evidence presented does not counter all theo-
ries of innocence there is a "mere suspicion" of the 
defendant's guilt. 57 Both federal and state case law hold 
that a "mere suspicion" of guilt cannot lead to a convic-
tion.58 Since the "mere suspicion" standard is subjective, 
case law is inconsistent with regard to convictions and 
acquittals. Cases resulting in acquittals with seemingly 
strong evidence to the contrary include one in which the 
defendant was seen away from the scene shortly after the 
crime occurred. 59 In another case, a defendant's pres-
ence in a room where a theft occurred was not strong 
enough evidence to meet the "mere suspicion" standard 
because others had access to the area. 60 
The discussion, supra, assumes, naturally, that a pros-
ecutor is able to build a case for trial to satisfy these stan-
dards for conviction. In cases of past civil rights crimes, 
however, that assumption is difficult to realize. Indeed, 
piecing together the prosecution of a past civil rights crimes 
is in and of itself a difficult endeavor. 
V. Litigation Problems 
Although circumstantial evidence may result in (or 
sustain) criminal convictions, evidentiary problems may 
arise while gathering evidence for cases years after the 
crimes occurred. Such problems include the admission of 
out-of-court statements, which may include statements 
from dead or lost witnesses, and racially sensitive evidence. 
Another problem is the possibility that evidence has been 
lost in the intervening years. 
The issue of the admissibility of out -of-court state-
ments is significant, if not crucial, in the context of past 
civil rights crimes. It is well recognized that out-of-court 
statements of witnesses may not be admissible hearsay if 
they are made long after the crimes occurred and are not 
subjectto cross-examination.61 However, United States 
Supreme Court precedent and the Maryland Rules of 
Evidence (Rules) provide exceptions. In Williamson v. 
United States, the Supreme Court held that out-of-court 
statements are admissible through hearsay exceptions.62 
In Maryland, some exceptions include: (l) present sense 
impressions;63 (2) excited utterances;64 (3) statements of 
then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition;65 
(4) former testimony;66 (5) statement under belief of im-
pending death;67 (6) statement against interest;68 and 
(7) statement of personal or family history.69 Indeed, in 
the 1994 prosecution ofMedgar Evers, killed in 1963, 
the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on a former testi-
mony exception to allow a transcript of an unavailable 
witness into evidence because the witness had been cross-
examined during previous testimony.70 
Past civil rights crimes prosecuted today, however, 
must overcome yet another evidence law burden - the 
landmark Crawford v. Washington decision.71 There, 
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 7-2 majority, con-
cluded that based on the Framers' understanding of the 
Sixth Amendment confrontation right, testimonial state-
ments of a witness absent from trial are admissible only 
where the witness is unavailable, and only where the de-
fendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.72 Jus-
tice Scalia emphasized that the history of the Confronta-
tion Clause supports two principles: (l) the principal evil 
at which the Clause was directed was the civil law mode 
of criminal procedure, particularly the use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused,73 and (2) 
the Framers would not have allowed admission of testi-
monial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial 
unless he was unavailable to testify and the defendant had 
a prior opportunity to for cross-examination.74 An extra-
judicial statement is testimonial in nature if the statement 
was made "undt:r cin:umstances which would lead an 
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objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial. "75 
Aside from the devastating effect Crawford may 
have on the prosecution of child molesters,76 it may se-
verely limit the breadth of available evidence against de-
fendants in civil rights cases. Indeed, statements made to 
police officers or prosecuting offices years ago may not 
be admissible if the witness is now dead or is otherwise 
unavailable to testify. 
As if Crawford is not in and of itself an unmovable 
hurdle, lost evidence may be.77 However, pursuant to the 
Rules the previous existence of lost evidence may be 
proved through authenticated public records describing 
the evidence.78 Also, a copy of a lost transcript may be 
admitted if authenticated. 79 
Naturally, the prosecution of civil rights crimes often 
includes racially sensitive evidence, ranging from evidence 
showing racial prejudice of the defendant to evidence 
showing membership in traditional racist organizations. 80 
Rule 5-403 permits the admission of relevant evidence 
unless it is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
VI. Beyond the Law: The Politics of 
Prosecuting Past Civil Rights Cases 
In the media age, polls drive campaigns and gov-
ernment action. True, there are some politicians with the 
courage and conviction to do what is right regardless of 
the political consequences. Yet, more and more, as the 
Karl Roves and James Carvilles of America drive the po-
litical decision-making process, major decisions must first 
be politically correct. Prosecuting past civil rights cases is 
not an exception to this prevailing trend. Today, these 
cases benefit from a more favorable political environment. 
"Before Emmett Till's murder, I had known the fear 
of hunger, hell and the Devil. But now there was a new 
fear known to me - the fear of being killed just because I 
was black," wrote Mississippi civil rights activist Ann 
Moody.81 Emmett Till was a fourteen-year-old from the 
South Side of Chicago visiting his relatives near Money, 
Mississippi.82 Joined by his cousin, Emmett met up with 
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some other black children outside Bryant's Grocery and 
Meat Market. 83 Outside of the store, Emmett showed off 
a picture of a white girl who was a friend of his in Chi-
cago.84 One of the boys told Emmett, "Hey, there's a 
[white] girl in that store there. I bet you won't go in there 
and talk to her. "85 Emmett took up the dare and went into 
the store. As he left, he told the woman, "Bye, Baby."86 
A few days later that woman's husband, Roy Bryant, re-
turned from a truckingjob. 87 The woman told her hus-
band about the incident in the grocery store. In response, 
he and his brother-in-law, 1. W. Milam, took Emmett from 
his cousin's home and killed him.88 Emmett was tortured 
with a metal fan that crushed his face and then he was 
dumped into the Tallahatchie River with a noose of barbed 
wire.89 Neither man was convicted of a crime.90 As Chi-
cago Sun-Times writer Mary Mitchell noted, "No one-
not a judge or jury - would dare convict the men who 
meted out the punishment.''91 
It has taken this nation, and Mississippi, forty-nine 
years to resurrect this case. Recently, Senator Charles 
Schumer (D-New York) and Congressman Charles 
Rangel (D-New York) urged the federal government to 
re-examine the 1955 murder ofEmmett.92 On May 10, 
2004, the United States Department of Justice and the 
Leflore County district attorney announced that they would 
reopen the case, which was prompted largely by two docu-
mentaries that claim the crime involved as many as ten 
people, not just the two men acquitted.93 
VII. Conclusion 
Prosecuting past civil rights crimes draws immediate 
media attention. The recent Till case developments and 
the 2002 prosecution of a York, Pennsylvania mayor for 
the 1969 race-riot murder of a young black woman are 
merely some examples.94 These cases, these moments of 
past sin and the failings of our criminal justice system, are 
instant dramas. Yet, for prosecutors, these cases may be 
among the most important tests of their respective careers, 
both legally and politically. America has moved faster, 
and stronger than most nations in addressing a history of 
violence and injustice. We still have further to go. An-
other step in the direction of healing is to open these cases, 
try these cases - should the evidence to prosecute exist-
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and ensure that justice is served. 
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